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Assessing the role of Spain’s 
AIReF in the context of EU fiscal 
policy
The work of the AIReF has helped to support progress on budget stability and, by 
increasing the reputational costs of non-complying public administrations, it has enhanced 
fiscal governance in Spain. Going forward, among addressing other challenges, the 
AIReF should strive to preserve its independence.
Abstract: In an effort to make progress on EU 
fiscal consolidation, the need for member 
states to have independent fiscal institutions 
(IFIs) is gaining acceptance. Spain’s IFI, 
the AIReF, was created in 2013 with the 
mandate of guaranteeing government 
compliance with the principle of budget 
stability. The results of a review of its first 
years of operation, in line with the OECD’s 
recent findings, show that the institution 
has consolidated its independence and 
credibility. The AIReF has helped to 
support progress on budget stability and, 
by increasing the reputational costs of non-
compliance, enhanced fiscal governance 
within Spain and the EU. Nevertheless, 
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the AIReF still faces noteworthy challenges 
apart from preserving its independence, 
including accessing necessary information, 
improving the methodology of its 
projections, and increasing the impact of its 
recommendations.
Introduction
On the economic front, the European 
project is, for a range of reasons, in the 
midst of challenges and reassessment. 
A combination of three factors: (a) the 
impact of the economic crisis and its 
management from a political standpoint; 
(b) the UK referendum vote to leave the EU and 
the reaction by the remaining member states; 
and, (c) national economic policy preferences 
that are not always mutually compatible or 
synchronised are raising serious questions 
about the future of the European Union and 
of the eurozone. 
As is often the case in crises, there is a 
certain amount of consensus regarding the 
facts, greater diversity of opinion regarding 
the causes, less agreement again about the 
responsibilities of the various parties and open 
confrontation regarding ideas and proposals 
as to how to fix the problem. 
To organise the debate, the outstanding areas 
for improvement to enhance EU economic 
governance are usually grouped into three: 
i) reform of financial sector architecture; 
ii) reform of institutional architecture; and, 
iii) reform of fiscal architecture (Claeys, 2017; 
Wolff, 2017; Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2018; Jones, 
2018).
This paper concentrates on the third aspect, 
the fiscal framework, and uses it to analyse the 
role of the first independent fiscal institution 
(IFI) created in Spain, the Independent 
Authority for Fiscal Responsibility (known as 
the AIReF for short) in helping to underpin 
fiscal discipline and the sustainability of 
public finances.
In the next section, we outline the current 
fiscal framework in the EU and the key 
factors determining the effectiveness of an 
IFI in helping to support sound fiscal policy. 
Then we analyse the AIReF’s first years in 
operation. To this end, we examine a recent 
review of the institution by the OECD and 
analyse the recommendations made by the 
AIReF between 2014 and 2016. Lastly, we 
present a set of conclusions. 
The EU’s fiscal framework and 
the role of independent fiscal 
institutions
The EU’s fiscal framework dates back to the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) adopted 
in 1997. The pact included a preventative 
arm and a corrective arm, both of which 
were designed with the overriding goal of 
facilitating and injecting credibility into the 
excessive deficit principle enshrined in 
the Maastricht Treaty. 
More specifically, the SGP set two fiscal 
rules for the member states: a deficit ceiling 
of 3% of GDP and a public borrowing limit of 
60% of GDP (Claeys, Darvas and Leandro, 
2016). However, as is well known, the pact 
has encountered serious enforcement issues. 
Indeed, nearly half of the member states were 
in breach of the borrowing rule for most years 
between 1999 and 2014, notably including 
France and Germany (Andrle et al. 2015).
In response to the SGP’s lack of effectiveness, 
the EU’s fiscal framework has been reformed 
several times. The Six-Pack (2011), Fiscal 
Compact (2012), the Two-Pack (2014) and the 
creation of the European Fiscal Board (EFB) 
in 2016 stand out in this respect (Claeys, 
Darvas and Leandro, 2016). 
Assessments of the current state of the EU’s 
fiscal framework are varied. There is an 
element of consensus that the successive rule 
changes have yielded a framework that is 
overly complicated, scantly transparent and 
poorly functioning. Against this backdrop, 
there are proposals calling for the modification 
of the current framework to address its lack of 
transparency and effectiveness (Andrle et al., 
2015; Claeys, Darvas and Leandro, 2016). 
Elsewhere, there are also calls for more radical 
overhaul of the existing framework in light 
of its complexity, ineffectiveness and in some 
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instances even counter-productive effects 
during the crisis (Manesse, 2014). 
The official stance taken by the European 
institutions, expressed in the last major 
strategic document about the future of the EU, 
the Five Presidents’ Report, is however  silent 
on the advisability or need to modify the fiscal 
framework and rules (Juncker et al., 2015).
Parallel to this rather low-profile official 
stance, debate on EU fiscal policy persists in 
a quest to strike a balance between two basic 
objectives (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018): 
 ■  Taking measures designed to boost 
discipline in the member states; and,
 ■  Pursuing reforms that have stabilising 
effects on the EU member states.
Within the first group of measures lies the 
idea of reforming the existing fiscal rules and 
the various agreements reached subsequently 
with the idea of simplifying them, making 
them more effective and enforceable. The 
second category of reforms includes new 
forms of temporary budgetary transfers 
among member states. As a corollary to this 
approach, the majority appears to be leaning 
towards finding a credible formula for the non-
bailout principle, i.e., the formal commitment 
that the states experiencing financial stress 
should not receive financial aid from the other 
member states unless they restructure their 
sovereign debt first.
From that perspective, in order to make 
progress on consolidation of the EU’s fiscal 
framework, the need for the member states 
to have independent fiscal institutions 
is gaining acceptance. In fact, the ‘Two 
Pack’ stipulates that the eurozone member 
states put in place “independent bodies for 
monitoring compliance with numerical fiscal 
rules” (Regulation [EU] No. 473/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council).
The arguments in favour of these bodies are 
clear-cut. IFIs, acting independently, tend to 
curb the discretion with which policy makers 
manage their public finances, reducing 
their “deficit bias”, as is well documented in 
the empirical literature. Nevertheless, the 
institutional design, dimension and breadth of 
duties tasked to the nearly 40 IFIs in existence 
at present vary significantly from one country 
to the next, even within the EU. 
According to the specialist literature (Beestma 
and Debrun, 2018), the attributes an IFI 
needs to make an effective contribution to 
the functioning of a fiscal framework are 
essentially three:
 ■ Independence;
 ■ Communication power; and, 
 ■ The degree to which the political system 
engages with the IFI, not just in theory but in 
practice, by embracing the budget stability 
objective and the IFI’s specific mandate. 
The first attribute, independence from 
political power, is crucial and enables an 
IFI to earn credibility vis-a-vis citizens and 
national and international economic agents. 
In fact, according to von Trapp and Nicol in 
Beetsma and Debrun (2018), it would appear 
that the IFIs and their respective governments 
are aligned on this principle as the level of 
independence of the OECD IFIs averages 
over 80% (in line with the estimated level 
of independence of the AIReF). As for the 
second attribute, optimum communication 
of the IFI’s mission and recommendations, 
it is vital that the IFI’s communication reach 
“ IFIs, acting independently, tend to curb the discretion with which 
policy makers manage their public finances, reducing their “bias 
towards deficit”, as is well documented in empirical literature.  ”
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expands so that the reputational cost for the 
political powers of adopting irresponsible 
fiscal conduct increases. Lastly, the third 
element, good-faith cooperation between the 
Executive and the IFI, is a prerequisite for 
enabling independence and communication. 
It is important to remember that just as a 
state can set up an IFI, it may also, if the 
circumstances made so doing desirable, 
adjust it to suit its purposes, tweaking its 
mandate or circumscribing its responsibilities. 
For further insight into this matter, see 
the references to the Hungarian case in the 
contributions by Wren-Lewis, von Trapp and 
Nicol, Wyplosz, Wehner, Page and Kopits in 
the volume published by Beetsma and Debrun 
(2018).
Analysis of the AIReF’s activities
Background
Spain’s IFI, the AIReF, was created in 2013 
with the mandate of guaranteeing compliance 
by the government – at all levels – with the 
principle of budget stability enshrined in 
Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution, 
amended in 2011. The AIReF’s activities are 
governed mainly by Spanish Organic Law 
2/2012 (April 27th, 2012) on Budget Stability 
and Financial Sustainability (the Stability Act). 
The Stability Act establishes three fiscal 
rules, in keeping with the SGP and the EU’s 
fiscal framework: (a) Spain’s governments 
may not run a structural budget deficit; 
(b) growth in public spending may not exceed 
the economy’s nominal growth (this is known 
as the “spending rule”); and, (c) the ratio of 
public borrowings to GDP may not exceed 
60%. The transition period for application 
of these fiscal rules spans until 2020. The 
Stability Act also reinforced the mechanisms 
in place for preventing breaches and creates 
new ones (Hernández de Cos and Pérez, 2013 
and Kasperskaya and Xifré, 2018).
The AIReF carries out its duties independently 
of the government even though formally 
it is attached to the Ministry of Finance 
and Civil Service. The AIReF’s main source 
of financing is the supervisory fee that all of 
the governments covered by its reports are 
obliged to pay.
The AIReF’s main activity is to issue the 
reports and recommendations legally-
mandated to it, including assessment reports 
on macroeconomic forecasts; projects and 
key headings in the various governments’ 
budgets; the governments’ initial budgets; 
and compliance with the budget stability, 
public debt and spending rule targets. The 
AIReF’s mandate includes the assessment 
and evaluation of the credibility of various 
economic forecasts and budgets.
The AIReF’s oversight remit encompasses all 
levels of government in Spain: the central or 
state government, the regional governments, 
the local governments, including all of the 
bodies under their governance, and the Social 
Security administration. More recently, 
the AIReF has become involved in the 
development and monitoring of ‘spending 
reviews’, i.e., analysis of the effectiveness of 
the spending programmes.  
As a result of its analysis and oversight 
work, the AIReF draws up recommendations 
addressed to the various governments and 
ministries containing proposals for improving 
and flagging indications of the breach of 
the budget rules. The AIReF conducts this 
activity under the scope of the ‘comply or 
explain’ principle, as is customary at IFIs. 
This means that when an administration 
“ The AIReF conducts activity under the scope of the customary ‘comply 
or explain’ principle – an administration receiving a recommendation 
from the AIReF must either comply with it or provide a reasoned 
explanation as to why it does not.   ”
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receives a recommendation from the AIReF, 
that administration must either comply 
with it or provide a reasoned explanation 
as to why it does not. Every quarter the 
AIReF publishes the responses received 
from the administrations in question, which 
has the effect of increasing the ‘reputation 
costs’ for institutions that fail to adopt its 
recommendations.
The recommendations for which a ‘comply 
or explain’ response is mandatory are in 
turn divided between: (i) recommendations 
stemming from shortcomings in 
information (‘scope recommendations’); 
and, (ii) recommendations stemming 
from matters of substance (‘substantive 
recommendations’). The first include requests 
for additional information and access to the full 
data needed by the AIReF.  The second set of 
recommendations inform the administrations 
of the initiatives and measures they need to 
take in order to comply with the principles of 
financial sustainability and budget stability, 
including the legally-stipulated preventative 
and corrective measures. Lastly, the AIReF 
also issues: (i) opinions and guidance on good 
practice that are not compulsory; (ii) studies 
about specific methodologies related to its 
field of intervention; and, (iii) a data lab. 
Analysis of the AIReF’s recommendations
This section analyses the recommendations 
issued by the AIReF distinguishing between the 
recipients, the type of recommendation issued 
and the contents of the recommendations, 
based on the institution’s annual reports. At 
the time of writing, the annual reports available 
are those corresponding to 2014, 2015 and 
2016, so that the analysis is limited to those 
three years. 
Exhibit 1 provides the breakdown of the 
recommendations, opinions and good practice 
guidance issued by the AIREF by topic and 
type of recommendation during its first three 
years in operation. 
The matters concerning transparency are the 
most frequent. Within this heading, the two 
main types of recommendations issued 
correspond to (i) guidance on good practice, 
which are not considered binding in terms 
of the ‘comply or explain’ principle; and, 
(ii) ‘scope recommendations’. Therefore, 
the difficulties encountered in accessing the 
information needed and the quality of 
the data received have constituted the biggest 
challenge faced by the AIReF in doing its 
work optimally. The AIReF even reached 
the point of a legal dispute with the Ministry 
of Finance, which had been requiring it to 
present information queries and data requests 
through a centralised information pool 
without directly engaging with the entities 
involved (von Trapp and Nicol, 2018). The 
European Commission got involved in this 
conflict (European Commission, 2017) taking 
the AIReF’s side and, as a result, the ministry 
corrected its initial stance, facilitating access 
to the required information (Ministry of 
Finance, 2017).    
The second most frequent type of 
recommendation relates to budget stability, 
with nearly all of the recommendations made 
in this area taking the form of ‘substantive 
recommendations’ and therefore subject to 
the ‘comply or explain’ principle. The fourth 
category by volume of recommendations 
– those addressing financial sustainability – 
similarly consists almost entirely of 
‘substantive recommendations’. The third 
most popular category relates to budgeting 
procedures; in this instance the most 
common type of recommendation takes 
the form of ‘guidance on good practice’, 
i.e., recommendations that do not require 
the recipient administration to respond in 
“ The difficulties encountered in accessing the information needed 
and the quality of the data received have constituted the biggest 
challenge faced by AIReF in doing its work optimally.    ”
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‘comply or explain’ format. Lastly, the fifth 
category, which addresses the spending rule, 
mainly features ‘scope recommendations’, 
indicating that the AIReF has encountered 
shortcomings in the information provided in 
terms of adequately appraising the matter. 
As for the recipients of these recommendations, 
Table 1 breaks down the recommendations, 
opinions and guidance issued by the AIReF 
between 2014 and 2016 by recipient and year. 
As the Table shows, the main recipient of the 
recommendations, opinions and guidance 
issued by the AIReF is the Ministry of Finance 
and Civil Service, to which this IFI is attached, 
accounting for over half of all the observations 
made. This in turn reflects the fact 
that it is the ministry that dictates the 
regulations and methodology governing a 
good part of the budget items for which the 
various administrations are then responsible. 
As a result, recommendations regarding 
fundamental regulations that apply to all 
administrations have to be addressed to this 
ministry. The recipient of the next highest 
number of recommendations is the Ministry 
of the Economy and Competitiveness, 
which is responsible for preparing the 
macroeconomic forecasts and economic 
scenarios underpinning the general state 
budgets and other financial planning 
tools. It is followed by the Ministry of 
Employment and Social Security. In fact, the 
recommendations addressed exclusively to 
the various ministries (the three listed above 
plus the Ministry of Education and Health) 
represent over three-quarters (77%) of all the 
recommendations issued by the AIReF during 
the period analysed.
After the ministries, the entities receiving the 
highest volumes of recommendations from 
the AIReF are the IGAE, Spain’s general state 
comptroller, and the regional governments as 
a whole. Here it is worth noting that in several 
instances, the recommendations issued by the 
AIReF are addressed simultaneously to more 
than one institution, usually a ministry and 
one or more regional administrations.
Table 2 rounds out the analysis by sorting 
the AIReF’s recommendations by topic and 
year. This table reproduces a selection of the 
key topics addressed in the reports issued 
by the AIReF between 2014 and 2016. Note 
that this is a partial selection in an attempt to 
exemplify the issues receiving the greatest 
attention in the institution’s first three 










Transparency Budget stability Budget procedures Financial sustainability Spending rule
Scope recommendations Substantive recommendations Opinions Guidance on good practices
Exhibit 1 Summary of recommendations issued by the AIReF between 
2014 and 2016 by topic and recommendation type 
Source: The authors, based on the AIReF’s annual reports (2014 - 2016). 
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analysis is limited to the two types of 
recommendations covered by the ‘comply 
or explain’ requirement, i.e., ‘scope 
recommendations’ (SCO) and ‘substantive 
recommendations’ (SUB). 
The first topic that stands out relates to the 
numerous references to the gaps encountered 
by the AIReF in attempting to compile the 
information it needs. Warnings about the lack 
of information are continuous and affect 
virtually all levels and sub-sectors of 
government (see for example SCO1, SCO2, 
SCO5, SCO7, SCO8, SCO9, SCO11, SUB3).
Related with this issue, the analysis also 
reveals the requests addressed by the AIReF, 
mainly to the ministries, asking for better 
explanations of the methodologies used to 
prepare the forecasts, models, etc. that are 
in turn used as the basis for setting budget 
targets (SCO4, SCO10, SCO11, SUB8).
Here it is worth underscoring the emphasis 
placed by the AIReF on the ‘spending rule’ 
stipulated in the Stability Act, highlighting the 
difficulties encountered in making it work in 
practice. The AIReF has repeatedly alerted the 
Ministry of Finance about the need to develop 
a methodology and a practical manual for 
its calculation and the advisability of setting 
up dedicated taskforces to address this issue 
within the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council 
and National Local Government Committee 
(SCO2, SCO5, SUB6).
Another relevant and recurring issue during 
the AIReF’s first years in operation, and 
an area in which it has defended a different 
stance to that taken by the government, 
is the need to set different deficit targets for 
the different regional governments (SCO2, 
SCO3, SCO11, SUB5, SUB7). The AIReF is 
of the opinion that, given the differences 
among the various regional governments 
in terms of starting positions and medium-
term scenarios, it would be advisable to set 
different and specific targets for each region 
with the aim of rendering them more feasible 
and credible (refer to Escrivá, Janeba and 
Langenus in Beetsma and Debrun, 2018). 
Related with this point, the AIReF has also 
repeatedly manifested the need to design and 
effectively apply preventative measures in 
order to prevent target breaches, particularly 
at the regional and local government levels 
(SCO12, SUB10, SUB11).
Other topics often raised in the AIReF’s 
reports include the need to revise the roadmap 
for delivering on the public borrowing target 
of 60% of GDP by 2020 in order to make it 
more feasible and credible (SUB12); the 
recommendation to have initial budgets and 
liquidity forecasts drawn up at the national 
accounting level (SCO6); the advisability of 
drawing up and publishing multi-year budget 
scenarios at all levels of government (SUB4); 
and the need to take measures designed to 
balance the Social Security system’s finances 
(SUB9). 
By way of a brief footer, note that in 2017, most 
of the recommendations issued by the AIReF 
continued to emphasise the importance of 
implementing preventative and corrective 
measures and the need to reinforce the 
consistency of the fiscal rules contemplated in 
the Stability Act. 
Summary of the independent assessment of 
the AIReF: OECD report of 2017
In November 2017, the OECD published a 
review of the AIReF (von Trapp et al., 2017). 
This assessment, committed to by the President 
of the AIReF, was undertaken by a group of 
five independent experts (two members 
“ In 2017, most of the recommendations issued by the AIReF continued 
to emphasise the importance of implementing preventative and 
corrective measures and the need to reinforce the consistency of the 
fiscal rules contemplated in the Stability Act.    ”
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of the Budgeting and Public Expenditures 
Division of the OECD’s Directorate for Public 
Governance, two experts on independent 
fiscal institutions from the Netherlands and 
the United States and one Spanish academic 
peer) following the OECD’s own methodology 
(OECD, 2014).
In general terms, the assessment concludes 
that in the first years of operation the AIReF 
has consolidated its independence. 
As for its structure, specifically the extent 
to which AIReF complies with the OECD’s 
principles for the creation of independent 
fiscal institutions (IFIs), the review scores of 
the AIReF are shown in Table 3. The AIReF’s 
level of compliance with the OECD’s criteria 
is essentially high (total in some instances) 
and only below 50% in the area of resources. 
In the case of resources, the reasons for 
the low score are threefold, according to the 
OECD: (a) AIReF’s already broad mandate is 
expanding with the risk of adding challenges 
to AIReF’s limited resources; (b) the Ministry 
of Finance makes changes in AIReF’s budget 
without consulting the agency; (c) there are 
no multiannual funding commitments, which 
might further enhance the independence of 
the AIReF.
Despite the AIReF’s strong start, the report 
flags three major challenges facing the 
institution:
 ■  The difficulties encountered in terms of 
access to the information needed to do 
its job. The review recommends, in line 
with international best practice, governing 
the relationship between the AIReF and 
the Spanish government by means of a 
memorandum of understanding. 
 ■  The need to balance its ambitions and 
stakeholder demands for new work (or 
extending the scope of its existing duties) 
against its budgetary and staff constraints. 
The OECD recommends that the AIReF 
avoid taking on additional tasks unless it is 
given commensurate resources to undertake 
these tasks.
 ■  Only around one half of the AIReF’s 
recommendations have been complied 
OECD principle Score Maximum
1. Local ownership 2 2
2. Independence and non-partisanship 6.5 7
3. Mandate 3 3
4. Resources 0.5 3
5. Relationship with the legislature 2.5 3
6. Access to information 1 2
7. Transparency 3.5 4
8. Communication 1 1
9. External evaluation 1 1
Total 21 (80%) 26
Table 3 Level of compliance by the AIReF with the OECD’s principles for IFIs 
(OECD, 2014)
Note: In the table above the following scores are assigned to the various assessment levels: Positive 
assessment (‘Yes’) = 1; negative assessment (‘No’) = 0; Partial assessment (‘Partial’) = 0.5.
Source: Adapted from Table 1.2 of von Trapp et al. (2017). 
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with. Indeed, the OECD report observes 
a significant difference in the pattern 
of responses by the central government 
relative to the sub-national (regional 
and local) governments. Whereas the 
central government opts to explain its 
non-compliance more often (62% of the 
recommendations received) than it chooses 
to comply (38%), at the sub-national 
government level, the pattern is exactly 
the opposite. Here is worth noting that 
compliance levels vary by region (Cantabria, 
Andalusia, Aragon, Castile and Leon and 
Valencia being more inclined to ‘comply’ 
and Madrid, Navarre and Catalonia being 
more inclined to ‘explain’). Refer to Figure 
4.6 of the Review.
Beyond these key points, the Review makes 
20 detailed recommendations grouped into 
four categories: inputs (6 recommendations); 
methodology and outputs (5); efforts at the 
sub-national level (3); and impact (6).
Regarding recommendations about inputs, 
the OECD suggests that AIReF “should avoid 
taking on additional tasks unless they are 
given commensurate resources to undertake 
these tasks with in-house staff” and that it 
“should use outside contractors sparingly”. 
The OECD recommends that the AIReF, the 
ministries and other relevant public 
administrations “work collaboratively to 
develop a memorandum of understanding 
on access to information, establishing which 
information AIReF need to fulfil its mandate 
and a mutually agreeable and collaborative 
process for information requests”.
In terms of methodology and outputs, the 
OECD report suggests that the AIReF could 
release projections for medium-term periods 
of three to five years; so far, the majority of 
AIReF documents are focused on the current 
and the upcoming year. It is also recommended 
that the AIReF releases more details about 
its economic and budgetary estimates and 
not only high-level summaries of the issues. 
Along the same lines, the OECD suggests 
the possibility that the AIReF examines the 
accuracy of its own projections and “whether 
there have been any significant biases in its 
own or the government’s forecasts”, as well 
as the possibility of analysing the reasons for 
these biases.
As far as subnational governments are 
concerned, the OECD recommends the 
AIReF “focus on improving the quality and 
deepening the reach of existing regional 
and local analysis”. In terms of impact, the 
OECD report contains the recommendation 
that the “AIReF should pursue a strategy of 
increased selectivity regarding its comply-
or-explain recommendations with the aim 
of emphasising and focusing on its most 
important messages in subsequent dialogue 
with relevant administrations and in its public 
follow-up”. In this respect, the AIReF is also 
advised to “periodically undertake stakeholder 
satisfaction surveys for key stakeholders groups 
such as parliamentarians and academics”.
Conclusions
The AIReF in its first years in operation has 
helped to support progress on budget stability 
and enhanced fiscal governance in Spain and 
the EU by increasing the reputational costs of 
those public administrations which are not 
fiscally responsible.
Judging by the criteria used most commonly 
to assess the effectiveness of independent 
fiscal institutions, the AIReF is endowed with 
an institutional design and mandate that are 
in line with international best practice. In 
terms of its performance, in its early years it 
has established a reputation for independence 
from the Executive. When it has considered 
it necessary, the AIReF has taken different 
positions to those of the Ministry of Finance 
to which it is attached, prompting the latter to 
alter its initial stance on occasion. This 
independence provides a good foundation for 
reinforcing the fiscal framework in Spain and, 
by extension, the EU. 
Beyond this procedural matter, the AIReF’s 
reports have highlighted two key matters of 
substance. Firstly, the need to find a better 
formulation, meaning a more user-friendly 
and effective one, of the spending rule 
stipulated in the 2012 Budget Stability Act. 
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Secondly, the recommendation that the one-
target-fits-all strategy applied to the regional 
governments should be revised. 
Indeed, it can be said that the first steps taken 
by the AIReF have helped unearth some of 
the limitations of the 2012 Act and provided 
strong arguments in favour of its reform 
(Kasperskaya and Xifré, 2018). In this respect, 
our conclusions highlight the necessary 
complementarity among all elements (laws, 
institutions, political will) to achieve fiscal 
sustainability.
Lastly, the AIReF still faces noteworthy 
challenges, including accessing the necessary 
information to do its job, as well as maintaining 
the independence and professionalism that 
have characterised its conduct during the 
initial years. It would be advisable to think 
carefully before expanding the scope of its 
activities if it is not possible to guarantee the 
provision of sufficient resources. It would also 
be useful for the wider public if the AIReF 
released more details on the methodology and 
assumptions under which it prepares its own 
estimates and assesses budgetary projections 
by public administrations and reported on 
their activity in a timely and more user-
friendly way.  
That said, the reputational capital and 
credibility earned by the institution since 2013 
are an important asset for the good of fiscal 
stability in Spain and the broader EU.
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